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Abstract. Ranking systems such as those in product comparison sites
and recommender systems usually use ratings to rank favorite items
based on both their quality and popularity. Since higher ranked items are
more likely selected and yield more revenues for their owners, providers of
unpopular and bad items have strong incentives to manipulate the rank-
ing in favor of their own items. This paper analyzes the adversary cost
for manipulating these rankings in a variety of scenarios. Particularly,
we analyze and compare the adversarial cost to attack ranking systems
that use various trust measures to detect and eliminate malicious rat-
ings to systems that use no such trust mechanism. We provide theoretical
results showing the relation between the capability of the trust mecha-
nism in detecting malicious ratings and the minimum adversary cost for
successfully changing the ranking. Furthermore, we study the impact of
sharing trust information between ranking systems to the adversarial
cost. It is proved that sharing information between two ranking systems
on common user identities and malicious behaviors detected can signifi-
cantly increase the adversarial cost to attack any of them under certain
assumptions. Our results are numerically evaluated showing that the es-
timated adversary cost for manipulating the item ranking can be made
significant when proper trust mechanisms are employed or combined.
1 Introduction
Ranking has become a popular and important feature of online business appli-
cations. A ranking system enables users to rate their favorite items based on
item quality and also according to their own preferences. Items may represent
services, products, sellable articles, digital content, or search results in differ-
ent application scenarios. To facilitate the searching of users, these ratings are
then used to rank a large number of items of the same category according to
both their quality and popularity, e.g. ranking of digital content in social sites
(Digg.com), of products in recommender systems (Amazon.com) and in search
engines (www.google.com/products).
The impact of user online opinions on sales and profits is well-known to
be significant [1]. One can reasonably expect that items with higher ranks are
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2more likely to be selected by clients and thus to produce more value for their
providers.However, there is a clear incentive for owners of unpopular and bad
items to employ malicious identities to promote (i.e. “ballot-stuff”) their own
items and demote (i.e. “badmouth”) competing ones to generate higher revenue.
In real applications these issues are inevitable. For example, sellers can pay
people for posting positive reviews on their products, as in [2] for Amazon reviews
for 65 cents each, or even hire botnets to conduct the attack.
Regarding manipulation-resistance of ranking metrics, there have been a
large number of works on studying resistance of Web page ranking algorithms,
such as by throttling Web spam via link structure and link credibility analy-
sis [3, 4]. These works are applicable to large scale ranking systems that sort
Web pages based on various criteria, such link quality and credibility of provider
sites [5,6]. The application of trust mechanisms [7,8] to improve the robustness
of a ranking system under adversarial attacks, such as ballot-stuffing and bad-
mouthing is also well-explored [4, 9]. However, the impact of the capability of a
trust mechanism in detecting malicious ratings to the robustness of the ranking
system using such mechanisms has not been analyzed yet.
To this end, in this paper, we present an analytical approach to evaluate
the robustness of a ranking system under attack by an intelligent adversary with
limited resources. Particularly, we analyze the cost of an adversary to successfully
manipulate the item ranking in smaller-scale systems, such as product rating
sites and recommendation systems. The adversarial cost is estimated as the
number of identities and ratings that need to be employed by the adversary to
successfully change the ranks of specific targeted items. We compare this cost
when specific trust mechanisms to eliminate biased ratings are employed or not.
The improvement in robustness of a ranking system using a trust mechanism
with a given capability to detect dishonest ratings is numerically evaluated to
be significant under certain assumption.
Moreover, we extend our analysis in a more interesting scenario where two
similar ranking systems share information regarding user identities and detect
malicious ratings mutually. This scenario is realistic for two reasons. First, col-
lecting and exchanging information regarding identities and activities of users
across systems are feasible in practice. Commercial initiatives for aggregating on-
line reputation information related to a person across different sites have become
increasingly popular, such as Online Reputation Monitor (reputation.distilled.co.uk),
Reputation Manager (www.reputationmanager.com), or Reputation Defender
(www.reputationdefender.com). The OASIS committee has also proposed stan-
dards for information exchange and reuse across reputation systems (www.oasis-
open.org/committees/orms). This standardization effort, if realized, would fur-
ther facilitate the integration of similar reputation-aware systems. Second, mali-
cious providers may want to publish their items in similar systems for maximizing
profits, while having limited resources. This limitation requires that the adver-
sary reuses a number of malicious identities across systems when posting ratings
to manipulate the ranking of its targeted items. Hence by sharing information
on the detection of malicious behaviors between two similar systems, more ma-
3licious users are discovered and eliminated, which in turn helps to improve the
robustness of both systems.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we provide theoretical results
showing the relation between the capability of the trust mechanism being used
to detect malicious ratings and the adversarial cost to attack a ranking system.
We also provide numerical evaluation of this relation in various settings. Second,
we extend the analysis to quantify the adversarial cost of attacking two similar
ranking systems sharing information on user identities and the detection of ma-
licious ratings. We show that, under certain realistic assumptions, two systems
with shared information regarding common user identities and trust evaluation
result can significantly increase the attack cost of an adversary. The analytical
framework in the paper can also be extended to estimate the robustness of more
complex ranking metrics under the presence of an adversary. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we describe the problem
of ranking items in the presence of malicious ratings. In Section 3, we analyti-
cally derive the minimum cost for the adversary to manipulate the ranking of
the items, when a trust mechanism that detects malicious votes with a certain
effectiveness is employed. In Section 4, we analytically prove that the adversarial
cost for manipulating the ranking of items increases when two systems exchange
information regarding user identities and detect malicious ratings. Our results
are numerically evaluated in Section 5, while in Section 6 we discuss the related
work. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude our work.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a ranking system with a set of items S, each has a binary static qual-
ity (good/bad). One item can be a representation (description) of similar arti-
cles/services provided by a seller and thus can be sold for different users. Let U
be the set of all rating users who are honest. Denote as r(u, s) ∈ {1, 0,−1} the
value of a rating by any user u ∈ U on an item s ∈ S, where a value r(u, s) = 0
implies that u does not rate s. A user u ∈ U in general reports honestly on the
item quality. Due to some observation noise, with a small probability 0 < ε¿ 1,
u may rate an item incorrectly, i.e., a bad item is sometimes rated positively and
a good item may be rated negatively. Items are then ranked by their quality and
popularity score (QP-score) f(s) defined for any item s ∈ S as:
f(s) =
∑
u∈U
r(u, s) (1)
where a rating r(u, s) is counted only once for each user u and each item s
Let S = {si, 1 ≤ i ≤ M} be the set of all items where si has an original
rank i according to the metric (1). Intuitively, i < j, or the item si is said to
have a higher rank than sj iff f(si) > f(sj). The metric f(.) counting number
of positive and negative votes on an item is usually used in existing systems to
rank items in term of their quality and popularity. The use of more sophisticated
metrics considering timestamp, and credibility of raters corresponding to other
trust-based ranking metrics that will be studied later on.
4Now consider an adversary who wants to boost the rank of an item sk to the
highest rank k∗ = 1 < k. Herein we use k∗ = 1 only to reduce the number of
notations, it is trivial to extend the analysis to any k∗ < k. It is also straight-
forward to use our analytical framework to the case where the adversary wants
to boost or lower the rank of a set of items instead of a single one. In order to
do so, the adversary uses a set of malicious users D to post positive ratings on
sk (the boosted item) and negative ratings on those items si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 (the
competing set). The total number of malicious ratings is C, and the cost of the
adversary includes both components C and | D |.
For each item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, denote as Ui and Di the set of honest and
malicious users who rate on si, respectively. The number of ratings on an item
si by a honest and malicious users are respectively xi =| Ui | and yi =| Di |.
Depending the true quality (good or bad) of si, the majority of xi honest ratings
on si would be positive or negative. Naturally,
⋃k
i=1Di = D and
∑k
i=1 yi = C,
since ratings items ranked lower than sk does not help boosting the rank of
the target item sk but increase the cost of the adversary. We assume that the
adversary knows the honest user set Ui of any item si and can estimate the
actual rank of every item. The system manager, however, does not know the
sets Ui, Di, and the target item sk.
The system designer wants the ranking to reflect the true quality and pop-
ularity of items as observed by the honest users, so that new users do not have
bad experience in using the system to choose their items. One naive approach
is to simply ignore the presence of a possible adversary, and items are ranked
according to the QP-score of each item s as in (1): fN (s) =
∑
u∈U∪D r(u, s). To
restrict the effect of malicious ratings posted by the adversary, a better way is to
rank items based on a trustworthiness measure of each rating, namely for each
item s, the following trust-based QP score of is used instead of (1):
fT (s) =
∑
u∈U∪D
r(u, s)t(u, s) (2)
where 0 ≤ t(u, s) ≤ 1 is the estimated trustworthiness of the rating r(u, s) and
measured differently depending on the trust management approach being used.
The goal of this work is to compare the optimal cost of the adversary, in terms
of its minimal numbers of ratings C and malicious identities | D |, to successfully
boost the rank of the item sk in many situations where different QP scores
fT (s), fN (s) are used to rank items, and given different possible approaches
to evaluate the rating trustworthiness. Note that in absence of the adversary
D = ∅, we have fT (s) = fN (s) = f(s), thus the trust-based and naive quality
score are in fact generalization of the normal quality score f(s). Since r(u, s) can
be considered as a random variable, i.e., subject to observation noise or behavior
of the rating user, we consider the expected value E[f(s)], E[fN (s)], E[fT (s)],
whenever the exact rating r(u, s) is unknown.
We only consider the most important cases where items in the competing set
si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 are of good quality (and thus shall be ranked highly for the
benefits of the users). As point out in the analysis, the other cases are similar
and thus skipped for space limitation.
53 Adversarial Cost to Influence the Trust-based Ranking
Consider the system in Section 2, with approximate xi =| Ui | honest (both
positive and negative) ratings on an item si, i = 1, ..., | S |. With the trust-based
QP-score (2) as a ranking metric, Proposition 1 gives the minimal adversarial
cost to manipulate the ranking.
Proposition 1. Suppose the system uses a trust mechanism that detects mali-
cious ratings on any item with probability 0 < γ < 1. It is possible to design a
ranking system in which the minimal adversarial cost, in expectation, to boost
the rank of an item from k to 1 includes the cost of creating | DT | identities
and posting CT =| DT | ratings on the target item sk, where:
| DT |= (x1 + xk)1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ (3)
Proof. First, we prove that there exists a simple trust management approach
that detects malicious ratings on any item with a probability 0 < γ < 1. The
following naive trust management approach to define the trustworthiness t(u, s)
of a rating satisfies such a requirement (see Fig. 1):
• a trusted rater e is used to monitor the quality of a randomly selected set
of items E ⊆ S, where | E |= γ | S |<| S |.
• for any u ∈ U ∪ D, if there exists some item s ∈ S such that the ratings
r(u, s)r(e, s) 6= 0, r(u, s) 6= r(e, s), we define t(u, s) = 0.
• for each of the remaining ratings r(u, s), the trustworthiness is proportional
to the number of ratings with the same value. Formally, t(u, s) =| Ut(s) |
/ | U(s) |, where U(s) ⊆ U ∪ D is the group of users who rate on s, and
Ut(s) ⊆ U(s) is the users with ratings r(u, s) on s.
{sk*...si... sk}
Ui = all honest users rating on si 
-1 1
Di = all cheating users rating on si 
Li = cheaters detected
-11
S = all items
Di - Li= undetected cheaters 
e
trusted rater
E=items monitored by 
trusted rater
1 -1 1
sk
si
sj
u u
Fig. 1. Detection unfair ratings on items by using a trusted rater.
Apparently, the above trust mechanism can detect malicious ratings on any
item s ∈ S with a probability γ, at the cost of the system designer evaluating
| E |= γ | S | items to learn of their true quality. Of course there may exist other
trust mechanisms that are more cost-efficient, i.e., require the evaluation of less
6than γ | S | services for a given capability of detection γ, but the designing of
such trust mechanism is not the focus of this work.
Recall that Ui and Di are correspondingly the sets of honest and cheating
raters on si. The trust-based QP score of an item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is fT (si) =∑
u∈Ui∪Di r(u, si)t(u, si). To effectively boost the rank of sk, the adversary needs
to post at least yi negative ratings on each item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and at least
yk positive ratings on the item sk. The goal of the adversary is to ensure the
expected trust-based QP-score of the target item sk higher than that of every
item of higher rank, i.e., E[fT (sk)] ≥ E[fT (si)], 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
Consider any item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k−1 with a good quality. Among honest users
Ui, a subset U ′i ⊆ Ui may give unfair (negative) ratings on si. A smaller subset
U ′′i ⊆ U ′i may be detected by the trust management approach as cheater (based
on erroneous ratings). Among those malicious users Di who rate si negatively
(to favor sk), a subset of them would be detected by the trust management
mechanism. Denote as Li ⊆ Di the set of malicious raters that are not detected.
Then, users in the group Pi = Ui − U ′i vote positively and those in the group
Ni = U ′i − U ′′i ∪ Li vote negatively on si. Note that Pi ∪Ni = Ui − U ′′i ∪ Li, as
in Fig. 2(a). The trustworthiness t(u, si) of a rating r(u, si) is estimated as:
• For u ∈ U ′′i ∪ (Di − Li) : t(u, si) = 0, i.e., users with erroneous observation
and malicious users are marked as cheaters.
• For u ∈ Pi = Ui−U ′i : t(u, si) = |Pi||Pi∪Ni| . Similarly, for u ∈ Ni = (U ′i−U ′′i )∪
Li, t(u, si) =
|Ni|
|Pi∪Ni| .
LiDi-Li
L2
Li (D2-L2) D2-L2
Ui
U2
U’i
U’’i
U2'U2'’
Di
D2 
LiDi-Li
Ui
U’i
U’’i
Di
(a) (b)
Dk
Z2 
Z
Dk2
(c)
Fig. 2. (a) Venn diagram of the set of malicious and honest users detected by using a
trust mechanism; (b) The set of malicious and honest users detected by combining two
trust management systems; (c) Different sets of malicious users used by the adversary
to attack the two systems
Eliminating ratings with 0 trustworthiness, i.e., those of users in the shaded
parts of Fig. 2(a), the trust-based QP-score of any si ∈ S, i = 1, ..., k−1 becomes:
fT (si) =
∑
u∈Pi
1.
| Pi |
| Pi | + | Ni | +
∑
u∈Ni
(−1) | Ni || Pi | + | Ni | =| Pi | − | Ni |
Since with a probability γ, malicious ratings on any item will be detected by the
trust mechanism, we have:
• E[| U ′i |] =| Ui | ε = xiε, and E[| U ′′i |] = E(| U ′i |)γ = xiεγ.
• E[| Di − Li |] = E[
∑
u∈Di 1{u detected}] =
∑
u∈Di E[1{u detected}] =|
Di | γ. It follows that E | Li |=| Di | (1− γ) = yi(1− γ).
7As a result E[| Pi |] = E[| Ui − U ′i |] = E[| Ui | − | U ′i |] = xi(1 − ε) and
E[| Ni |] = E | U ′i−U ′′i ∪Li |= E[| U ′i | − | U ′′i | + | Li |] = xiε−xiεγ+yi(1−γ) =
(1− γ)(xiε+ yi). Therefore, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1:
E[fT (si)] = E[| Pi |]−E[| Ni |] = xi(1−ε)−(1−γ)(xiε+yi) = xi(1−2ε+εγ)−yi(1−γ)
Similarly, for the target item sk, noting honest users mostly rate sk negatively
while malicious users rate it positively, we have:
E[fT (sk)] = −E[| Pk |]+E[| Nk |] = −xk(1−ε)+(1−γ)(xkε+yk) = −xk(1−2ε+εγ)+yk(1−γ)
The item sk has a higher rank than si iff E[fT (sk)] ≥ E[fT (si)], or:
yk + yi ≥ (xk + xi)1− 2ε+ εγ1− γ
The minimal number of ratings the adversary needs to insert into the system is
the solution of the following integer program:
CT = min{y1 + y2 + . . .+ yk}
s.t. yk + yi ≥ (xi + xk)(1− 2ε+ εγ)/(1− γ), i = 1, ..., k − 1 (4)
where all xi, yi are non-negative integers, xis are fixed. One can also verify that
as the first k − 1 items are assumedly good, the number of ratings on them
satisfies xi ≥ xi+1, for i = 1, ..., k − 2. This program has the following complete
set of solutions1:
yk = (x1 + xk)(1− 2ε+ εγ)/(1− γ)− d; y1 = d; yi = 0, 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
where 0 ≤ d ≤ dmax = (x1 − x2)(1− 2ε+ εγ)/(1− γ) (5)
Each solution above (for each 0 ≤ d ≤ dmax ) requires the adversary to post
the same total number of ratings CT =
∑k
i=1 yi = (x1+xk)
1−2ε+εγ
1−γ . For each d,
a corresponding attack strategy is to create at least max{CT − d, d} = CT − d
identities2. Each of these CT −d identities posts a positive rating on the boosted
item sk. The adversary also uses d identities to post negative ratings on the
highest ranked item s1.
With the attack strategy of d = 0, the adversary needs to create CT identities,
and the probability the attack is successful is 1 − γ. For d > 0, the adversary
needs to create fewer (CT − d) identities, since he can use the same user to
post ratings on both items s1 and sk. However, a strategy with d > 0 leads to
higher chance that these identities are detected, and the probability that the
attack is successful in this case becomes smaller, i.e., (1− γ)2 < 1− γ. Formally,
considering the expected gain and the risk of the adversary being detected, we
can prove that the utility of the adversary is maximized at d = 0 in any of the
two cases (1) γ is within a certain range or (2) the gain of the adversary if the
1 For presentation clarity, we skip the rounding operators d.e or b.c when mentioning
quantities involving integer values, e.g., the number of ratings and identities.
2 We assume without loss of generality that x1+ xk ≥ 2(x1− x2), hence CT − dmax ≥
dmax and thus max{CT − d, d} = CT − d
8attack is success is very large compared to its cost of creating dmax malicious
identities. The proof is skipped due to space limitation. If we assume the case
that the adversary cares most about the probability of success of the attack,
the optimal strategy of the adversary is when d = 0, which incurs the following
cost of creating at least | DT |= (x1+xk) 1−2ε+εγ1−γ identities and posting at least
CT =| DT | ratings on the item sk, as claimed by the proposition. uunionsq
For simplicity of the explanation, in this paper we do not present the analysis
for the general case where an item si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k has a true quality qi ∈ {1, 0}
(good or bad). By similar reasoning, this general result can be obtained by
replacing the factor x1+xk in (3) with (−1)1−q1x1−(−1)1−qkxk. Also by analogy,
one can verify that by replacing x1 in (3) with xk∗ to obtain the increase in the
adversarial cost to boost the rank of the target item to any desired rank k∗ < k.
Following immediately from Proposition 1, we have an estimate of the extent
of rank manipulation that can be done by an adversary.
Corollary 1. If the system uses a trust mechanism that can detect malicious
ratings on any item with probability 0 < γ < 1, an adversary with capability to
create at most | D | identities and posts C ratings may manipulate the rank of a
favorite item from the origin k to the highest rank k∗ ≤ k defined by:
k∗ =
k
min
k′=1
{k′ : (xk′ + xk)1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ ≤ min(C, | D |)} (6)
By similarly reasoning, we have another result on the minimal adversarial
cost to manipulate ranks in a system without any trust management mechanism
to eliminate malicious ratings (Proposition 2).
Proposition 2. In a system with no trust management mechanism to detect
malicious users and eliminate their ratings, the minimal cost of the adversary to
boost an item with rank k to rank 1 includes:
• The cost to create | D |= (x2 + xk)(1− 2ε) identities.
• The cost to post C = (x1 + xk)(1− 2ε) ratings on the two items s1 and sk.
The optimal attack strategy is to post dmax = (x1 − x2)(1− 2ε) negative ratings
on the top item s1 and post C − dmax positive ratings on the target item sk.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 for γ = 0. The difference is in the
optimal attack strategy of the adversary. If the system uses no trust mechanism
to detect malicious users and eliminate their ratings, the optimal strategy of the
adversary to boost an item with rank k to rank 1 is attained at d = dmax , for
which the adversary needs to create only C − dmax identities and uses them to
vote negatively for s1 and rate positively on the target item sk.
From Proposition 2, we can also estimate to which extent an adversary with
a fixed cost may manipulate the rank of his or her favorite items (Corollary 2).
Corollary 2. Consider a system with no trust management mechanism to de-
tect malicious users and eliminate their ratings. An adversary with capability to
create at most | D | identities and posts C ratings to the system may manipulate
the rank of its favorite item from k to the highest rank k∗ ≤ k defined by:
k
∗
= max{
k
min
k′=1
{k′ : (xk′+1 + xk)(1− 2ε) ≤| D |},
k
min
k′=1
{k′ : (xk′ + xk)(1− 2ε) ≤ C}} (7)
9Compared between the cost in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, using a
trust management mechanism that detects malicious ratings on any item with a
probability γ would increase the minimal adversarial cost by some magnitudes:
| DT | / | D | ' (x1 + xk)(1− 2ε+ εγ)
(x2 + xk)(1− 2ε)(1− γ) > 1 (8)
CT /C ' 1− 2ε+ εγ
(1− 2ε)(1− γ) > 1 (9)
Our analysis is general as the notion of γ include the capability of the trust
mechanism to detect malicious on any item. There may exist other trust mecha-
nisms that are more efficient in terms of guaranteeing a higher detection proba-
bility γ. These mechanisms might consider the reputation of the raters, credibil-
ities of the item providers, and the correlation of ratings among raters to each
others, etc. Designing such trust mechanism is, however, an orthogonal issue to
our analysis. For example, one way to increase the detection probability γ is
to use trust-distrust propagation as in our previous work [10], where a rater is
evaluated as cheating if some of its ratings are evaluated to be incorrect and/or
similar to the ratings of those users already discovered as malicious.
The cost of attacking the system also strongly depends on the set of votes
by honest users, i.e., xi. In systems where honest users outnumber the mali-
cious users deployed by the adversary, manipulation of the trust-based ranking
is much more costly to the adversary. Existing techniques to restrict the number
of identities created by the adversary in can be easily integrated to our analytical
framework to restrict the capability of the adversary to manipulate the ranking.
Using a Trust Management Mechanism with Non-uniform Capability
of Detection Malicious Ratings
Generally, the probability that the trust mechanism detects malicious ratings on
different items may be non uniformed. For example, the trust mechanism may
focus more on protecting of popular (and usually higher ranked) items, thereby
increasing the probability of detecting unreliable ratings on these items. Let γi
be the probability that malicious ratings on an item si ∈ S are detected and
eliminated. As a generalization of the analysis in Section 3, the optimal cost of
the adversary to successfully manipulate the rank of the item sk is the solution
to the following integer program:
Cext = min{y1 + y2 + . . .+ yk}
s.t. yk(1− γk) + yi(1− γi) ≥ xi(1− 2ε+ εγi) + xk(1− 2ε+ εγk) 4= φi, i = 1, ..., k − 1
where all 0 < γi < 1 are fixed, all xi are fixed non-negative integers, and xi ≥
xi+1, for i = 1, ..., k − 2.
The probabilities γi are inherent to the trust mechanism, possibly determined
by the system designer, while unknown to the adversary. The solution to the
above optimization problem is the lower bound of the cost of the adversary. It
is also our interest to evaluate which setting of γ1, ..., γk, ..., γ|S| would result in
a higher minimal cost of the adversary. Finding closed-form solutions for these
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cases is non-trivial and thus is done numerically in Section 5. The baseline for
this evaluation is the adversary cost of a selection of items with equal probability
for monitoring γi = γ is used (3,??).
Let i0 = argmax1≤i≤k−1φi. We can find a closed-form solution for the above
optimization program for the case γi0 ≥ γk. This case corresponds to, for exam-
ple, when the system designer focuses more on protection of higher ranked items
rather than on the lower rank ones that likely includes the target item sk. In this
case the optimal strategy of the adversary is to create at least | Dext |= φi01−γk
identities, and use these identities to post Cext =| Dext |= φi01−γk ratings on
the item sk (see Appendix A for a detailed analysis). In a simple case where
γi ≥ γi+1, 1 ≤ i ≤| S | −1, it follows that φi0 = φ1 = (x1 + xk)(1 − 2ε + εγ1).
Compared to the cost in Proposition 1, the current system would increase the
adversarial cost by a magnitude:
Cext
CT
=
| Dext |
| DT | '
φi0
1− γk .
(1− γ)
(x1 + xk)(1− 2ε+ εγ) =
(1− γ)(1− 2ε+ εγ1)
(1− γk)(1− 2ε+ εγ) . (10)
Therefore, the system that can better protect higher ranked items may be either
stronger or weaker than another system that can detect malicious ratings on any
item with the same probability γ, depending on γ1, γ.
In a general case, we need to quantify the adversarial cost of manipulate the
ranking with different settings γi, 1 ≤ i ≤| S | to evaluate whether it is better to
use a trust mechanism to protect higher ranked items or not, i.e., the detection
probability γi is higher for small i. Finding closed-form solutions for these cases
is non-trivial and thus is done numerically in Section 5.
4 The Benefits of Sharing Trust across Ranking Systems
This section presents the analysis of the adversarial cost in a system that uses
an open trust management approach for detection and elimination of malicious
ratings. That is, the system exchanges information regarding the identities of
malicious users detected with another ranking system. Let S2 be the item set of
the second system. Given any item s′j ∈ S2, define U2j the set of honest users
with ratings on s′j , and U2 =
⋃
s′j∈S2 U2j . Also, let D2j be the set of malicious
users with ratings on s′j , and also define D2 =
⋃
s′j∈S2D2j .
Assume that the second system uses another trust management approach
that can detect malicious ratings on any item with a probability 0 < γ2 < 1. In
this paper we assume that the two ranking systems are designed to automatically
and reliably share the identities of malicious users detected to each other, and
system managers have little incentives to modify the software implementation to
tamper such information. Fair and reliable information sharing between systems
are an important issue yet beyond the scope of this paper.
For the case where two systems do not share any information, the adversary
would need a set of D users to post CT ratings to boost his favorites item sk
in the first system. Suppose that the goal of the adversary when attacking the
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second system is to boost the rank of an item s′k2 ∈ S2 from k2 to k∗2 = 13.
Then, the adversary would use another set of malicious users D2 to post C ′T
ratings on his favorite items sk2 in the second system. According to the analysis
in section 3:
CT = (xk + x1)
1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ =| D | and C
′
T = (x
′
k2 + x
′
1)
1− 2ε+ εγ2
1− γ2 =| D2 |(11)
where x′i, i = 1, ..., k2 have similar meanings to those of the first system.
Suppose that the adversary is able to create up to N =| D ∪D2 | identities
in two systems for its malicious purposes. It is required that N > max{CT , C ′T },
otherwise with allN identities the adversary is still unable to attack both systems
successfully. We will evaluate the benefit of sharing information between two
systems where such sharing is beneficial to both. That happens if the adversary
does not have enough resources and needs to use a certain number of identities
in both systems for its attacks, i.e., when N < CT +C ′T . Under this restriction,
the adversary would use CT among N identities to post CT ratings on the
first system. The posting of C ′T ratings in the second system will be done by
employing: (1) the unused N −CT identities; (2) CT +C ′T −N among those CT
identities already used in the first system.
Hence the cost of the adversary in case of no information sharing is:
• The cost of creating N identities, where max{CT , C ′T } ≤ N ≤ CT + C ′T .
• The cost of posting CT + C ′T ratings in both systems.
When the two systems share trust evaluation results, the adversarial cost is:
• The same cost of N identities as in the case of not sharing information.
• The cost of posting RT̂ ratings, which would be defined later on.
We want to analyze how the cost of the adversary in the case of sharing trust
evaluation result differs from the case of not sharing any information, i.e., to
quantify RT̂ − CT − C ′T .
Denote τi =| Ui ∩ U2 |, 1 ≤ i ≤ k as the number of honest users who post
ratings on si and also appear in the second system. We may approximate that
τi =| Ui ∩ U2 |≈ τ/ | S |, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where τ is the number of common honest
users who post ratings in both systems. Similarly define τ ′i =| U2i ∩ U |≈ τ/ |
S2 |, 1 ≤ i ≤ k2 the number of honest users who post ratings on s′i ∈ S2 and
also appear in the first system. The following main result gives us an estimation
of the benefit of sharing information between the two systems.
Proposition 3. Consider two ranking systems with capabilities γ, γ2 of detec-
tion malicious ratings, where 0 < γ ≤ γ2 < 1. Assume ∆ be the number of
identities the adversary needs to reuse in two systems, where:
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ min{(xk + x1)
1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ , (x
′
k2
+ x
′
1)
1− 2ε+ εγ2
1− γ2
} (12)
If the two systems share trust evaluation information to each other, then the
difference of the adversary cost to attack the two systems between two cases of
3 Again, k∗2 = 1 reduces the notations without loss of generality of the analysis.
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sharing vs. non-sharing of information is bounded below by:
RT̂ − CT − C′T >
∆γ
1− γ −
εγ2(τk + τ1)(1− 2ε+ εγ)
(1− γ)2 −
εγ(τ ′k2 + τ
′
1)(1− 2ε+ εγ2)
(1− γ2)2
(13)
The proof is given in Appendix B of the paper.
Proposition 3 gives us an estimate of the difference RT̂ −CT −C ′T . This con-
clusion is hold under the extremely worst case assumptions: the adversary knows
other common users (τi, τ ′i), knows of which system is better at detecting mali-
cious activities (γ, γ2) to develop an optimal strategy of ratings and placement
of malicious entities in the two systems.
The increase in the cost RT̂ − CT − C ′T mostly depends on the shortage of
identities ∆ of the adversary. The fewer number of identities the adversary has,
the higher number of common identities it shall reuse across the two systems, and
the more ratings it needs to insert into both systems to successfully manipulate
the ranks of its favorite items. For most ∆ and where the noise ε is negligible, it
is apparent that RT̂ − CT + C ′T > 0, or the adversarial cost to manipulate the
ranking in both systems in the case of sharing trust information between the
two systems is higher than the adversarial cost CT + C ′T where no information
is shared. The capabilities of the two trust mechanisms in detecting malicious
ratings, i.e., the probability γ, γ2 also play an important rule in increasing this
total adversarial cost. The sharing of information, however, may also lead to some
false positives when estimating common users as cheating. These observation
noise however plays a minor role, as the two negative terms on the right hand
side of (68) are small, given small values of ε.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we numerically evaluate our results. All items including the target
items are assumed to be good (but differ in popularity), which can be proven as
even less costly for the adversary to promote them, and with the least difference
between the number of ratings between items (hence the minimum adversarial
cost is the lowest possible). The estimates are for ε = 0.05 and M = |S| = 100
items. There are xi = M − i honest ratings for each item with rank 1 ≤ i ≤
M . Fig. 3 evaluates the increase in the minimal adversarial cost |DT |/|D| with
respect to uniform detection capabilities γ of the trust management and with
various values of the original rank k and desired rank k∗ < k of the target item.
We observe that even in this pessimistic scenario, the use of a trust mechanism
with reasonable detection capability γ = 0.5 doubles the adversarial cost to
manipulate the rankings in terms of the number of identities, irrespective of the
original rank of the target item. The increase in adversarial cost by the number
of malicious ratings CT /C has a similar trend. Also, the raise of the adversarial
cost for promoting the lowest ranked item can be achieved by increasing the
detection capability of the trust mechanism being used γ (Fig. 3).
Next, we consider the impact to the minimal adversarial cost of a trust mech-
anism with non-uniform detection capabilities γ. For simplicity, we assume linear
ascending and descending γ functions with respect to the item original rank and
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Fig. 3. Impacts of a trust mechanism with different detection capabilities γ to the
adversarial cost measured in number of malicious identities to be created: (a) the
target has various original rank k, the desired rank k∗ = 1; and (b) the target has
original rank k =M/2 and various desired ranks k∗.
numerically solve the linear program (14). The adversarial identities and rat-
ings ratios (| DT | / | D | and | CT | / | C | respectively) with respect to the
initial item rank are depicted in Fig. 4. Thus, an ascending γ distribution in-
creases the minimum adversarial cost for promoting lower ranked services. Also,
considering multiple different γ distributions (Fig. 5), we observe that a trust
mechanism that focuses more on protection more of lower ranked items increases
the minimal adversarial cost to promote ranking of these items.
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Fig. 4. Identities (a) and ratings (b) cost ratio for promoting a service with rank k with
or without a trust mechanism employing an ascending or descending γ distribution.
The impact of sharing trust information to the overall robustness of the two
systems for an example case is given in Fig. 6, measured in the increase of
adversarial cost (the number of ratings the adversary needs to insert into both
systems). The two systems are assumed to use trust management mechanisms
with similar detection capabilities γ = γ2, have to similar item sets | S |=|
S2 |= M with roughly τ = 10% common honest users. The measurements are
done in three representative cases where the target items have different original
ranks in the two systems. The estimates are based on Eq. (68) in the worst case
scenario where there is the least difference between the popularity of the items,
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Fig. 5. Identities (a) and ratings (b) minimum cost for promoting a service initially
ranked last with different γ distributions.
xi = M − i, 1 ≤ i ≤ M,x′j = M − j, 1 ≤ j ≤ M . Observe that the sharing
of information between two systems helps to significantly raise the total cost
of the adversary to attack the two systems, thus strengthening both systems
significantly. The conditions for this sharing of trust information to be beneficial
to both systems, i.e., log(RT̂ − CT − C ′T ) > 0 are: (1) the detection capabilities
of the two systems are sufficiently high, and (2) the resources of the adversary
are limited, e.g., γ, γ2 > 0.5 and ∆ > 5 in the case of Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Impact of the trust information sharing to the increase of adversarial cost (in
logscale) where: (a) the (origin) rank of the target is average in both systems; (b) the
rank of the target in one system is high. The results in other cases are similar.
6 Related work
The most related work to this paper is those study the resistance of Web page
ranking algorithms and prevention of Web spams, e.g., via link structure and link
credibility analysis [3,4]. The use of trust and reputation mechanism to minimize
the influence of adversarial attacks in ranking systems has also attracted much
effort [7,8]. EigenTrust [11] presents a global trust metric to measure the credi-
bility to a node in a network based on inter-connecting links among nodes. This
trust mechanism can be used to build an attack-resistant ranking system similar
to the PageRank approach [5] to ranking Web pages. Other works suggested
using reputation-based trust management technique to improve robustness of
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ranking systems include [4, 10]. However, there seems to be little analysis on
impacts of trust mechanisms to the cost of manipulation a ranking system. The
most related work in this aspect is [9], where the authors study vulnerabilities
and attacks by an adversary with a given cost to voting systems and propose
defense mechanisms based on item popularity. This work is different from ours
since it only considers the binary voting result on item quality. Our work is
more general: we consider ranking systems that use both popularity and quality
of items as ranking metrics. We also analyze and quantify the cost of targeted
adversarial attacks to manipulate the rankings in different scenarios, where the
systems use trust management mechanisms with different detection capabilities.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the cost of manipulation of items ranking in systems with
different capabilities of detecting unfair and biased ratings. We provide theoreti-
cal results showing the role of the capability of the trust mechanism being used to
the cost for the adversary to successfully attack manipulate the ranking, and nu-
merically evaluate this relation in various settings. Furthermore, we analyze and
verify numerically that two ranking systems with shared information regarding
common user identities and detection of malicious behaviors may help to in-
crease the attack cost of an adversary. This claim holds mainly because creating
identities is costly and the adversary may need to reuse a number of malicious
users across two systems to save the total cost. According to our analysis, under
certain assumptions sharing information among systems would circumvent com-
mon cheating users, making it harder for an adversary to inverse the ranking
produced by the participating systems, and strengthening them significantly.
A Adversarial cost for systems using trust mechanism
with non-uniform probability of malicious detection
Let γi be the probability that malicious ratings on an item si ∈ S are detected
and eliminated. As a generalization of the analysis in Section 3, the optimal
cost of the adversary to successfully manipulate the rank of the item sk is the
solution to the following integer program:
Cext = min{y1 + y2 + . . .+ yk}
s.t. yk(1− γk) + yi(1− γi) ≥ xi(1− 2ε+ εγi) + xk(1− 2ε+ εγk) 4= φi, i = 1, ..., k − 1 (14)
where γi is fixed, all xi are fixed non-negative integers, and and xi ≥ xi+1, for
i = 1, ..., k − 2.
Define i0 = argmax1≤i≤k−1φi, we have:
yk(1− γk) + yi0(1− γi0) ≥ φi0 = max
1≤i≤k−1
φi (15)
We can easily find a closed-form solution for the case where γi0 ≥ γk. This
case corresponds to, for example, when the system designer focuses more on
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protection of higher ranked items rather than on the lower rank ones that likely
includes the target item sk. For the other case where γi0 < γk, finding the
solution set is non-trivial and thus should be done numerically.
Given that γi0 ≥ γk, let ŷi, i = 1, ..., k is a solution to the above integer
program, it follows from (15) that:
(ŷk + ŷi0)(1− γk) ≥ ŷk(1− γk) + ŷi0(1− γi0) ≥ φi0 (16)
⇒ ŷk + ŷi0 ≥
φi0
1− γk (17)
Apparently, ŷk =
φi0
1−γk , ŷi = 0, i 6= k is a solution. Therefore, the complete
set of solutions is any ŷi, i = 1, ..., k such that:
ŷk =
φi0
1− γk − d (18)
0 ≤ ŷi0 = d ≤ dmax , other ŷi = 0 (19)
Each solution results in the same optimal number of ratings Cext =
∑k
i=1 ŷi =
φi0
1−γk . The value dmax can be found by the following constraint:
ŷk(1− γk) + ŷi(1− γi) ≥ φi, i = 1, ..., k − 1, i 6= i0 (20)
⇒ ( φi0
1− γk − d)(1− γk) + 0.(1− γi) ≥ φi (21)
⇒ d ≤ φi0 − φi
1− γk (22)
⇔ d ≤ φi0 −max
k−1
i=1,i 6=i0 φi
1− γk = dmax (23)
Similar to the analysis of Proposition 1, considering the expected gain and
the risk of the adversary being detected, that the utility of the adversary is
maximized at d = 0 in any of the two cases (1) γ is within a certain range
or (2) the gain of the adversary if the attack is success is very large compared
to its cost of creating dmax malicious identities. Therefore, the adversary needs
to create at least | Dext |= φi01−γk identities, and use these identities to post
Cext =| Dext |= φi01−γk ratings on the item sk.
For the other case where γi0 < γk, finding the solution set is non-trivial.
B Proof for Proposition 3
Proof. Given an item s′j ∈ S2 from the second system, we define the following
similar notations (see Fig. 2(b) for an illustration):
• U2j : all honest users with ratings on s′j . U2 =
⋃
s′j∈S2 U2j is thus the set
of all honest users with ratings on some items.
• U2′j ⊆ U2j : honest users with wrong rating on s′j (due to observation noise)
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• U2′′j ⊆ U2′j : honest users with wrong rating on s′j and detected as cheaters.
The set U2′′ =
⋃
sj∈S2 U2
′′
i is the set of honest users of the second system
wrongly detected as cheaters.
• D2j ⊆ D2: cheating users with wrong ratings on s′j (malicious behaviors).
D2 =
⋃
s′j∈S2D2j is thus the set of malicious users in the second system.
• L2j ⊆ D2j : cheating users undetected by the trust evaluation in the sec-
ond system. The set of cheaters detected is D2j − L2j . Hence D2 − L2 =⋃
sj∈S2 (D2i − L2i) is the set of cheating users correctly identified by the
second system.
The set of raters detected as cheating by the second system are therefore in
U2′′∪(D2−L2). This set is shared by the second system for the first. In exchange,
the first system also shares similar result for the second one. Such a sharing can
be generalized to many systems, so as the analysis in this work. Fair and reliable
sharing of such information between two systems are not considered in this work.
We assume that open trust systems are designed to automatically share results of
their malicious detection to each other reliably, and system managers have little
incentives to modify the software implementation to send wrong information.
The misbehavior detection U2′′∪ (D2−L2) from the second system helps to
identify more cheaters for the first systems. Our main hypothesis is that there
are certain users (both honest and malicious) who appear and rate items on
both systems. Such common users do exist due to various reasons. For example,
the adversary may have items in both systems, whose ranks need to be boosted.
As identities are costly, it may need to reuse some identities in one system for
another. This is even more true in cases where real persons are hired by (bad)
providers to rate and promote their items, more malicious behaviors on many
items on different systems bring more benefits to users.
For any user u ∈ U ∪D, any item si ∈ S, i = 1, ..., k, the first system uses a
modified trust evaluation function t̂(u, si) for every rating r(u, si) as follows.
1. t̂(u, si) = 0 if ∃v ∈ U2′′ ∪ (D2− L2) and u and v can be linked to the same
user, e.g., using the same credentials such as email when registration. Thus
any user detected (wrongly or correctly) as cheating in the second system
and appears in the first system are also marked as cheating by the first4.
Concretely, t̂(u, si) = 0 for u ∈ (Di − Li) ∪ U ′′i ∪ (Li ∩ (D2− L2)) ∪ ((Ui −
U ′′i ) ∩ U2′′) (the shaded parts in Fig. 2(b)).
2. For other ratings r(u, si) where u does not appear and detected as cheating
in the second system, the trustworthiness of the rating is define according
to the majority rule. That is, define Pi = Ui−U ′i − ((Ui−U ′i)∩U2′′) as the
group of users voting positively on si, Ni = [Li − (Li ∩ (D2−L2))]∪ [(U ′i −
U ′′i )− ((U ′i −U ′′i )∩U ′′2 )] the group of users voting negatively on si, we have:
• For u ∈ Pi : t̂(u, si) =| Pi | /(| Pi | + | Ni |).
• For u ∈ Ni : t̂(u, si) =| Ni | /(| Pi | + | Ni |).
From section 3, we have the following observations:
4 Different trust integrating policies can be used here, but we limit our study to only
this simple case
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• | Ui |= xi, E | U ′i |= xiε, E | U ′′i |= xiεγ, so E | Ui − U ′′i |= xi(1− εγ).
• | Di |= yi, E | Li |= yi(1− γ).
Let zi =| Di ∩ D2 |≤ yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k be the number of cheating raters who
posts biased ratings on the item si of the first system and who also appears in
the second system. Denote δ2(j) the probability a cheating user u rates on an
item sj ∈ S2, we have:
E[| Li ∩ (D2− L2) |] = E[
∑
u∈Di∩D2
1{u rates si ∈ S and not detected}1{u rates sj ∈ S2 and detected}]
= | Di ∩D2 | Pr[u rates on si ∈ S and not detected]×
Pr[u rates on sj ∈ S2 and detected]
= zi(1− γ)
∑
sj∈S2
γ2δ2(j)
= zi(1− γ)γ2
Note that τi =| Ui ∩ U2 |, 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
E | Ui − U ′i ∩ U2′′ | = E[
∑
u∈Ui∩U2
1{u rates correctly on si ∈ S} ×
1{u rates wrongly on sj ∈ S2 and incorrectly detected as cheater}]
= | Ui ∩ U2 | Pr[u rates correctly on si ∈ S]×
Pr[u rates wrongly on sj ∈ S2 and incorrectly detected as cheater]
= τi(1− ε)εγ2
The expected sizes of the two groups Pi and Ni are:
E[| Pi |] = E[| (Ui − U ′i)− ((Ui − U ′i) ∩ U2′′) |]
= E[| Ui − U ′i |]− E[| (Ui − U ′i) ∩ U2′′ |]
= xi(1− ε)− τi(1− ²)²γ2
= (xi − τi²γ2)(1− ε)
E[| Ni |] = E[| Li − (Li ∩ (D2− L2)) |] + E[| Li | −E | Li ∩ (D2− L2) |]
= yi(1− γ)− zi(1− γ)γ2 + (xiε− xiεγ)− τiε(1− γ)εγ2
= yi(1− γ)− zi(1− γ)γ2 + ε(1− γ)(xi − τiεγ2)
Similar to the case of one system (Section 3), one may verify that the trust-
based QP-score of an item si ∈ S, i = 1, ..., k − 1 can be computed as:
fT (si) = | Pi | − | Ni |
⇒ E[fT (si)] = E | Pi | −E | Ni |
= (xi − τi²γ2)(1− ε)− yi(1− γ) + zi(1− γ)γ2 − ε(1− γ)(xi − τiεγ2)
= (xi − τiεγ2)(1− 2ε+ εγ)− yi(1− γ) + zi(1− γ)γ2
Similarly, the modified score of the target item sk is (noting that honest users
mostly vote negatively on sk):
E[fT (sk)] = −E | Pk | +E | Nk |
= −(xk − τk²γ2)(1− 2ε+ εγ) + yk(1− γ)− zk(1− γ)γ2
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In expectation, the item sk is ranked higher than si iff E[fT (sk)] ≥ E[fT (si)].
In other words:
yk + yi ≥ [xk + xi − ²γ2(τk + τi)]1− 2ε+ εγ1− γ + (zk + zi)γ2
The optimal number of ratings CT̂ of the adversary to successfully attack the
first systems is the solution to the following linear integer program (IP):
CT̂ = min{y1 + y2 + ...+ yk} subject to:
yk + yi ≥ (xk + xi − εγ2(τk + τi))1− 2ε+ εγ1− γ + (zk + zi)γ2, i = 1, ..., k − 1(24)
yi ≥ zi, i = 1, ..., k (25)
where xj , yj , τj , zj , j = 1, ..., k are non-negative integers, all xi, τi, zi, i = 1, ...k is
fixed, xi ≤ xj , for i ≤ j, i, j = 1, ..., k − 1.
Use the new variables ui = yi − zi, i = 1, ..., k, we have another equivalent
program (IP2):
min {u1 + u2 + ...+ uk} subject to:
uk + ui ≥ gi, i = 1, ..., k − 1 (26)
ui ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., k
where gi, i = 1, ...k is defined as:
gi = (xk + xi − εγ2(τk + τi))1− 2ε+ εγ1− γ + (zk + zi)γ2 − zi − zk (27)
= (xk + xi − εγ2(τk + τi))1− 2ε+ εγ1− γ − (zk + zi)(1− γ2) (28)
Suppose that ûi, i = 1, ..k be the solution for the IP2. From (26), let i0 =
argmaxk−1i=1 gi, then:
ûk + ûi0 ≥
k−1
max
i=1
gi (29)
Since ui ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., k, the complete set of solutions to IP2 is:
ûk = max{0, k−1max
i=1
gi} − d (30)
ûi0 = d (31)
ûi = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i 6= i0 (32)
where 0 ≤ d ≤ dmax = max{0, k−1max
i=1
gi} −max{0, k−1max
i=1,i6=i0
gi} (33)
The solution of the original program IP is thus:
ŷk = max{0, k−1max
i=1
gi}+ zk − d (34)
ŷi0 = zi0 + d, (35)
ŷi = zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, i 6= i0 (36)
where 0 ≤ d ≤ dmax = max{0, k−1max
i=1
gi} −max{0, k−1max
i=1,i6=i0
gi} (37)
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Any of the above solutions requires the adversary to post the same optimal
number of ratings:
CT̂ =
k∑
i=1
ŷi = max{0, k−1max
i=1
gi}+
k∑
i=1
zi (38)
= max{0, k−1max
i=1
{(xk + xi − εγ2(τk + τi))
1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ − (1− γ2)(zk + zi)}}+
k∑
i=1
zi (39)
Similar to the previous section, we assume that the adversary cares most
about the probability of success of the attack. The optimal strategy of the ad-
versary is for d = 0, otherwise with the same user posting ratings on two items
si0 and sk, the probability that these identities are detected would be higher.
This optimal strategy means that the adversary creates and uses all | DT̂ |= CT̂
identities to post positive ratings on sk. In fact, we can extend the analysis to
the case where the optimal strategy is for d > 0, for which the adversary needs
to create a smaller number of identities. However, the analysis becomes much
more complex.
The reason the adversary uses malicious users with similar identities in the
two systems for the sake of saving its cost when attacking both systems. Hence
it is necessary to estimate whether the adversary should use common malicious
users in two systems to minimize the total number of identities to be created.
Consider the first system. The optimal solution ŷi, i = 1, .., k given in (34,35,
36) corresponds to the following strategy of the adversary to boost rank of the
item sk.
• For the target item sk: the adversary uses a set of malicious users Dk from
the first system and zk identities from the second system to post ŷk =| Dk |
+zk ratings on sk. We have | Dk |= max{0,maxk−1i=1 gi}.
• For items si, i = 1, ..., k−1: the adversary uses zi identities from the second
system to post zi ratings on each si.
Therefore, the set of malicious users to be used by the adversary in the first
system is:
D = Dk ∪ Z (40)
where Z ⊆ D2 is set of identities borrowed from the set of malicious users D2
in the second system. These borrow identities are used by the adversary to post
a total of
∑k
i=1 zi ratings on those items si, i = 1, ..., k.
Assume that the goal of the adversary when attacking the second system is
to boost the rank of an item s′k2 ∈ S2 from k2 to 1. By similar reasons, the set
of malicious users in the second system is:
D2 = Dk2 ∪ Z2 (41)
Z2 ⊆ D is set of identities borrowed from the first system to rate on items
in the second system. Dk2 is the set of malicious users who only appear in the
second system and is used to rate the item s′k2 ∈ S2.
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The set of malicious users used by the adversary to attack both systems is:
DT̂ = Dk ∪ Z ∪Dk2 ∪ Z2 (42)
Fig. 2(c) illustrates the relation among different sets Dk, Z, Z2, Dk2 . Clearly,
the malicious set DT̂ is smallest iff Z ⊆ Dk2 and Z2 ⊆ Dk. That is, the same
malicious users in one system, e.g., Dk2 , are used to rate items in the other, e.g.,
to rate item si, i = 1, ..., k in the first system. Under such a situation, the total
minimal number of identities the adversary needs to create in the two systems
is:
| DT̂ |=| Dk | + | Dk2 | (43)
From Eq. (28):
| Dk | = max{0, k−1max
i=1
gi} (44)
= max{0, k−1max
i=1
{(xk + xi − εγ2(τk + τi))
1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ − (zk + zi)(1− γ2)}} (45)
Similarly, we have:
| Dk2 | = max{0, max1≤i≤k2−1
{(x′k2 + x
′
i − εγ(τ ′k + τ ′i))
1− ε+ 2εγ2
1− γ2
− (z′k + z′i)(1− γ)}} (46)
where the notations x′i, z
′
i, τ
′
i , i = 1, ..., k2 have similar meanings to those of the
first system.
The optimal number of ratings CT̂ the adversary must post in the first sys-
tem, given fixed zi, i = 1, ..., k is:
CT̂ = max{0,
k−1
max
i=1
{(xk + xi − 2ε+ εγ2(τk + τi))
1− 1ε+ εγ
1− γ − (1− γ2)(zk + zi)}}+
k∑
i=1
zi(47)
= | Dk | +
k∑
i=1
zi (48)
Likewise, the optimal number of ratings C ′
T̂
to be posted in the second system
is:
C′
T̂
= | Dk2 | +
k2∑
i=1
z′i
Thus the total cost of the adversary to attack both systems includes two cost:
(1) to create | DT̂ | identities and (2) to post RT̂ = CT̂ + C ′T̂ ratings in the two
systems. Given a fixed number of identities N , the goal of the adversary is to
determine the number of common users zi ≥ 0, z′j ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., k, j = 1, ..., k2
such that:
minimize RT̂ = | Dk | + | Dk2 | +
k∑
i=1
zi +
k2∑
j=1
z′j (49)
= | DT̂ | +
k∑
i=1
zi +
k2∑
j=1
z′j (50)
subject to: | DT̂ | = | Dk | + | Dk2 |= N (51)
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Or equivalently:
minimize RT̂ = N +
k∑
i=1
zi +
k2∑
j=1
z′j (52)
subject to: | Dk | + | Dk2 | = N (53)
For simplicity, denote:
fi
4
= (xk + xi − εγ2(τk + τi))1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ , i = 1, ..., k − 1 (54)
f ′i
4
= (x′k2 + x
′
i − εγ(τ ′k2 + τ ′i))
1− 2ε+ εγ2
1− γ2 , i = 1, ..., k2 − 1 (55)
We can find the solution of the above optimization problem as follow. Assume
| Dk |= n < N , and | Dk2 |= N − n in Eq. (53). From Eq. (45,46), we have:
| Dk | = max{0, k−1max
i=1
{fi − (zk + zi)(1− γ2)}} = n (56)
⇒ fi − (zk + zi)(1− γ2) ≤ n, ∀i = 1, ..., k − 1
⇒ zk + zi ≥ fi − n
1− γ2 ,∀i = 1, ..., k − 1 (57)
⇒ ∃i0 ∈ [1, k − 1] : zk + zi0 ≥
k−1
max
i=1
fi − n
1− γ2 (58)
For n ≥ 0 and ẑk ≥ 0, we note that n ≤ maxk−1i=1 fi < N .
From the constraint (58), it follows that
∑k
i=1 zi ≥ maxk−1i=1 fi−n1−γ2 . The mini-
mal value
∑k
i=1 zi = max
k−1
i=1
fi−n
1−γ2 is attained for any 0 ≤ n ≤ N , at for example,
ẑk = maxk−1i=1
fi−n
1−γ2 , ẑi = 0, i = 1, ..., k − 1.
Due to the symmetry, we also get
∑k2
j=1 z
′
j ≥ max1≤j≤k2−1 f
′
j−(N−n)
1−γ . One
possible assignment is z′k2 = ẑ
′
k2 = max1≤j≤k2−1
f ′j−(N−n)
1−γ , and z
′
j = ẑ′j =
0, j = 1, ..., k2 − 1 for any 0 ≤ n ≤ N .
The objective function in Eq. (52) gives us:
RT̂ ≥ N +
k∑
i=1
ẑi +
k2∑
j=1
ẑ′j
≥ N + k−1max
i=1
{ fi
1− γ2 } −
n
1− γ2 +
k2−1
max
j=1
{ f
′
j
1− γ } −
N − n
1− γ
≥ N + k−1max
i=1
{ fi
1− γ2 }+
k2−1
max
j=1
{ f
′
j
1− γ } − (
n
1− γ2 +
N − n
1− γ ), ∀0 ≤ n ≤ N (59)
We consider the two following cases:
• γ = γ2, i.e., the two systems have comparable probability of detecting
misbehavior. In this case, one can verify that:
RT̂ ≥ −
Nγ
1− γ +
k−1
max
i=1
{ fi
1− γ }+
k2−1
max
j=1
{ f
′
j
1− γ } (60)
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• γ 6= γ2: without loss of generality, assume that γ2 > γ, or the second system
offer better capability of detecting malicious ratings than the first one. Thus
n
1−γ2 +
N−n
1−γ =
N
1−γ + n(
1
1−γ2 − 11−γ ) is maximized at the maximal value of
n = maxk−1i=1 fi. In this case, we have ẑi = 0, i = 1, ..., k, or the adversary
uses no identities from the second system. From (59), the optimal number
of ratings in this case is:
RT̂ ≥
k−1
max
i=1
{ fi
1− γ2 }+
k2−1
max
j=1
{ f
′
j
1− γ } (61)
+N − ( N
1− γ +
k−1
max
i=1
fi(
1
1− γ2 −
1
1− γ )) (62)
≥ − Nγ
1− γ +
k−1
max
i=1
{ fi
1− γ }+
k2−1
max
j=1
{ f
′
j
1− γ } (63)
A difference between the two cost is computed as follows, given a known ∆.
RT̂ − CT − C′T > −
Nγ
1− γ +
k−1
max
i=1
{ fi
1− γ }+
k2−1
max
j=1
{ f
′
j
1− γ } − CT − C
′
T
= − (CT + C
′
T −∆)γ
1− γ − CT − C
′
T +
k−1
max
i=1
{ fi
1− γ }+
k2−1
max
j=1
{ f
′
j
1− γ }
>
∆γ
1− γ +
k−1
max
i=1
{ fi
1− γ } −
CT
1− γ +
k2−1
max
j=1
{ f
′
j
1− γ } −
C′T
1− γ (64)
On the other hand, from Eq (54), and note that 0 < γ2 < 1, τi ≤ xi, i =
1, ..., k, one has:
k−1
max
i=1
{ fi
1− γ } −
CT
1− γ ≥
f1
1− γ −
CT
1− γ
≥ 1
1− γ ([xk + x1 − ²γ2(τk + τ1)]
1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ − (xk + x1)
1− 2ε++εγ
1− γ )
= −εγ2(τk + τ1)(1− 2ε+ εγ)
(1− γ)2 (65)
By symmetry, we also have:
k2−1
max
j=1
{ f
′
j
1− γ } −
C′T
1− γ ≥ −
εγ(τ ′k2 + τ
′
1)(1− 2ε+ εγ2)
(1− γ2)2
(66)
Since max{CT , C ′T } ≤ N < CT + C ′T , there are at least ∆ = CT + C ′T −N
identities used by the adversary in the two systems, where:
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ min{CT , C′T } = min{(xk + x1)
1− 2ε+ εγ
1− γ , (x
′
k2
+ x
′
1)
1− 2ε+ εγ2
1− γ2
} (67)
With ∆ defined as above, and from the two inequalities (65,66) in (64), it
follows that:
RT̂ − CT − C′T >
∆γ
1− γ −
εγ2(τk + τ1)(1− 2ε+ εγ)
(1− γ)2 −
εγ(τ ′k2 + τ
′
1)(1− 2ε+ εγ2)
(1− γ2)2
and Proposition 3 follows naturally. uunionsq
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